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Observations on the State of Shareholder Participation in 
Corporate Governance 
Barbara Leventhal 
Securities and Exchange Commission* 
I was very pleased to receive Professor Stettler's invitation to speak to you 
tonight about corporate governance. The subject is a timely and fascinating 
one, with more serious implications for the accounting profession than are 
generally recognized. In an obvious sense, there is a direct relationship between 
the structure and composition of corporate boards and the ability of auditors to 
maintain their independence. This relationship has been acknowledged by 
Congress, the Commission, and the profession. It is well established, as was 
noted by the Commission on Auditors ' Responsibilities last January, that "[t]he 
board of directors, with outside members and an audit committee when ap-
propriate, is the best vehicle for achieving and maintaining balance in the rela-
tionship between the independent auditor and management." More recently, 
the A I C P A has demonstrated its agreement with this proposition by consider-
ing whether there is a need for independent audit committees as a condition 
for an independent audit. 
Other Calls for Reform 
Less obvious perhaps but equally significant is the direct parallel between 
the issues facing the accounting profession and those facing the corporate com-
munity. In both cases perceived problems and a decline i n public confidence 
have given rise to Congressional concern and calls for reform. Radical but 
similar solutions, such as federal licensing of accountants and federal chartering 
of companies have been suggested. The question which must be answered i n 
both cases is not whether change must come but how it w i l l come—and whether 
the solutions w i l l be supplied by the private sector or whether they w i l l be 
imposed by government. 
In recent months, there has been an incredible amount of activity i n the 
field of corporate governance. In addition to the Commission's re-examination 
of its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder participa-
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility 
for any private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's 
colleagues on the staff of the Commission. 
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tion i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally, corpo-
rate accountability projects have been announced by the F T C and the Department 
of Commerce. Fol lowing hearings held last summer by the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies, Senator 
Metzenbaum has appointed an advisory committee to make recommendations 
relating to the need for federal m i n i m u m standards legislation. A working 
group of that committee is scheduled to report back to Senator Metzenbaum 
within the next six weeks. In the private sector, the American Bar Association, 
the American L a w Institute, the Business Roundtable, the American Assembly 
and other organizations have undertaken a variety of corporate governance 
projects. Rarely does a week go by without an article appearing i n some major 
publication on this subject. Graduate students are gathering on my doorstep i n 
droves for assistance i n researching their corporate governance theses, and if 
that were not evidence enough of a national movement, several weeks ago the 
N e w Y o r k Times published an editorial calling for the word "governance" to 
be stricken from the English language because of its pretentiousness and overuse. 
Dissatisfaction with Corporate Governance 
W h i l e the scope and focus of the various corporate governance projects 
differ, the projects all reflect a certain uneasiness or dissatisfaction with the 
way i n which large modern corporations function. This dissatisfaction is not 
economic, for it is widely acknowledged even by critics that the corporate 
sector has performed well i n providing goods, services, jobs and investment 
returns. Rather, there is a public perception that corporations have become vast 
aggregations of unchecked political and economic power wi th the capacity to 
do grave harm to society. Recent events, including widespread illegal conduct, 
mistreatment of consumers and shareholders, self-dealing, and misuse of corporate 
funds for personal gain have led many divergent groups to conclude that a 
problem exists and that the time has come to re-examine the checks and balances, 
internal and external, that regulate corporate conduct and to reconsider the 
basic questions about the role and responsibilities of the corporations in society. 
A s the staff member in charge of the Commission's corporate governance 
hearings, I have spent a substantial portion of the last year immersed i n gov-
ernance questions. 
It is from this background that I draw the following comments on the status 
of that proceeding and offer you some personal observations. 
The Hearings on Corporate Governance 
In a release issued last A p r i l , the Commission announced its intention to 
re-examine its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder par-
ticipation i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally. 
The decision to undertake this study was based on the fact that recent events, 
such as the numerous corporate disclosures concerning questionable and illegal 
payments, had served to focus public attention on the subject of corporate ac-
countability and raised questions about the adequacy of existing checks and 
balances related to corporate management. These events underscored the con-
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cerns expressed many years ago by Berle and Means that the theoretical corporate 
governance model is a myth i n the context of a large publicly held corporation. 
They asserted that directors who are chosen by management do not effectively 
monitor management conduct, and furthermore, since elections of directors 
are most often mere ratifications of management's slates, directors are not 
answerable to shareholders through the electoral process. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was granted a broad Congres-
sional mandate under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to make 
rules i n connection with the solicitation of proxies which are necessary or ap-
propriate i n the public interest or for the protection of investors for the purpose 
of assuring fair corporate suffrage. Relative to this mandate, the Commission 
was concerned that existing regulations might not provide shareholders adequate 
opportunities to participate meaningfully i n corporate governance or the corporate 
electoral process. T h e Commission noted that shareholders generally receive 
limited information about certain significant corporate policies and practices on 
matters not submitted to shareholders for their approval, and that shareholders 
have limited access to corporate proxy machinery. Election contests are rarely 
feasible because of the huge expenses involved, and the right to make nomina-
tions at annual meetings is of little practical significance, since at that point 
proxies have already been received by management and the number of share-
holders attending an annual meeting typically is small. Despite the breadth of 
the Commission's existing authority, it recognized that a number of questions, 
such as the fundamental question of how corporations can best be made more 
responsive to their shareholders and the public at large, transcended the proxy 
rules in significance and that some methods of obtaining greater accountability 
could not be achieved within the present statutory framework. Comments there-
fore were requested on the desirability of Commission support for federal legis-
lation, such as a b i l l establishing m i n i m u m federal standards of corporate 
conduct and shareholders' rights. 
The preliminary stages of the re-examination consisted of a request for 
public comments and the holding of public hearings on a variety of issues 
relating to corporate governance and corporate responsibility. Whi le too numer-
ous to mention in detail here, these issues fell into three categories— 
• The adequacy of existing avenues of communication between share-
holder and corporations, and particularly, whether shareholders should 
be provided with more information than is now available with re-
spect to socially significant matters affecting their corporations. Also 
involved was whether Rule 14a-8 regarding shareholder proposals, 
should be amended to further facilitate the presentation of shareholder 
views and concerns i n the corporate proxy materials. 
• The role of the shareholders in the corporate electoral process and 
whether the Commission should amend its proxy rules to provide 
shareholders access to corporate proxy materials for the purpose of 
nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors. 
• Whether additional disclosure relevant to an assessment of the quality 
and integrity of management should be required, such as information 
relating to the existence and composition of corporate nominating 
committees, the existence of business and personal relationships be-
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tween nominees or their affiliates and the board, time spent on cor-
porate affairs by incumbents, directors resignations and reasons there-
for, and more detailed or comprehensive disclosure of management 
remuneration and transactions. 
Related questions, such as the appropriate role of the self-regulatory or-
ganizations i n improving corporate governance through revisions of their listing 
requirements, the perceived costs and benefits of various changes, and the need 
for revisions in the format of proxy cards were also considered. 
Public Hearings Response 
The response of the public to the Commission's request for input was en-
couraging. In total, more than three hundred persons and organizations in-
cluding corporations, business associations, government officials, public interest 
and religious groups, law firms, bar associations, financial analysts, academics, 
accountants, and individuals submitted written comments or testified during 
the five weeks of public hearings. So voluminous were the materials offered to 
the Commission, in fact, that the staff spent the winter fighting through masses 
of paper, attempting to draw some conclusions from the array of comments and 
proposals presented. 
W h i l e the paper war is not quite over, we are beginning to see the light at 
the end of the tunnel. Shortly, the staff intends to present a concept paper to 
the Commission and seek authorization to develop a number of rule proposals 
for publication. The staff is also preparing an extensive report for publication 
which w i l l present, i n excruciating detail, a summary of the information con-
tained i n the record of this proceeding along with staff analysis and recom-
mendations concerning the various issues under study. 
Emerging Trends 
Although our final tally has not been completed, a few general trends have 
emerged from the record. First, while a number of commentators believe that 
the present system is working well and that corporations are fulfi l l ing their eco-
nomic functions in a satisfactory manner, there is a growing recognition that 
the old notion that corporate responsibility is limited to returning a profit is 
obsolete, and that new accountability mechanisms are necessary. There is also 
an increasing awareness that regardless of the adequacy of existing checks and 
balances or the degree to which corporate accountability has broken down, there 
is a public perception that problems exist amid a decreasing level of confidence 
i n corporations by shareholders and consumers. This lack of confidence has 
obvious implications for the ability of companies to raise capital in the future. 
Second, although there is a widely held perception that both individual and 
institutional investors are passive "creditors" of a company more interested i n 
that company's income stream than in playing an active ownership role in cor-
porate affairs, it is clear that these investors are becoming increasingly concerned 
with certain corporate policies and expressing growing frustration about their 
inability to influence management decisions. Whi le major financial institutions 
are still somewhat squeamish about using their voting power to influence man-
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agement decisions, individual shareholders, universities, church groups and 
pension funds are showing less hesitation to politicize the corporate electoral 
process. 
T h i r d , there is clearly growing, although by no means unanimous, support 
for a number of proposals designed to give shareholders more information in 
proxy statements and to provide them with added opportunities to participate 
in the corporate electoral process. 
Boards of Directors as a Focal Point 
Although a large number of proposals were made regarding ways in which 
corporate accountability could be improved, and it would be simplistic to suggest 
that any one of them was supported by the majority of commentators, we did 
encounter substantial support for the notion that the key to improved corporate 
governance is the evolution of stronger, more independent boards of directors. 
Various means to strengthen boards were suggested, including the creation of 
increased opportunities for shareholder input into the electoral process, the adop-
tion of S E C disclosure requirements which would stimulate structural changes, 
encouraging the voluntary establishment of nominating committees and the 
inclusions of more independent, nonaffiliated outsiders on the board, and the 
enactment of legislation specifying the fiduciary obligations of directors and 
officers and providing certain shareholder rights, redressable i n federal court. 
A more drastic legislative solution, involving federal chartering of corporations, 
also was advocated by a small number of witnesses. However, the concept of 
establishing constituency boards, an integral part of federal chartering, proved 
to be extremely unpopular. 
N o t surprisingly, the business community expressed a strong preference for 
voluntary action i n lieu of the more heavy-handed approaches, citing i n support 
of this position, the many encouraging developments and innovations which 
have been adopted by companies i n recent years, such as the establishment of 
audit and other standing committees, the inclusion of more outsiders on the 
board, voluntary disclosure, and improved shareholder communication programs. 
Other more skeptical witnesses suggested that these so-called voluntary changes 
have occurred only i n response to governmental prodding, and that reliance on 
voluntarism would not result i n meaningful reform. 
W h i l e it is clear that there is no one answer to the numerous issues which 
have been raised, my own view is that the commentators who stressed the i m -
portance of the role of the board of directors i n monitoring corporate conduct 
and improving corporate accountability are correct. The evolution of stronger, 
more independent boards wi th a broader understanding of the long term social 
and economic responsibilities of the modern corporation and an ability to truly 
represent the shareholders, monitor management performance, and approve 
major policies would appear to be the most effective means of making corporations 
more accountable. Moreover, whether or not one agrees with the recent sugges-
tion of Chairman Wil l iams that boards be composed entirely of independent 
outsiders with the exception of the chief executive officer and that the C E O not 
serve as chairman of the board, it seems to me to be indisputable that independent 
directors, who are neither employees of the corporation nor providers of profes-
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sional or business services, are more able to ask the probing questions that must 
be asked of management. Given adequate compensation, adequate information, 
and an adequate understanding of their responsibilities, such boards should be 
well equipped to perform their function. 
A u d i t committees composed entirely of independent directors with direct 
access to the outside and internal auditors and prescribed duties covering all 
facets of the audit process obviously are desirable, although as was demonstrated 
in the National Telephone Case, the existence of an audit committee is meaning-
less absent an understanding of committee responsibilities and procedures to 
perform them. I look forward with interest to the A I C P A ' s recommendations 
in this regard. Similarly, nominating committees which do not include any 
management directors should strengthen the effectiveness of boards by reducing 
the indebtedness felt by nominees to the C E O and expanding the universe of 
candidates from which board members are chosen. Compensation committees 
are yet another promising accountability tool, if properly constituted. Taken 
together, the effect of these structural reforms should be to restore, at least i n 
part, the validity of the theoretical model of corporate governance under which 
management is answerable to the board. 
These propositions are of course i n no way novel. They are widely espoused 
by large segments of the business community and government. Recently a no 
less radical publication than Business Week called for the election of genuine 
shareholder representatives as board members i n place of the crony system which 
now prevails. The only real question is how reforms w i l l be achieved. 
Effecting Needed Reforms 
O n this point, it is clear that the easiest and quickest method of effecting 
change either would be for each corporation to adopt structural reforms volun-
tarily and immediately or for Congress to mandate such change. I do not believe 
the former is likely to happen, and the latter, while conceivable at some point 
i n the future, has a number of serious disadvantages, including the stifling effect 
it is likely to have on innovation and experimentation. Somewhere between these 
two extremes I believe that a number of interesting possibilities exist. 
It seems to me that there are several alternatives available to the S E C 
within its existing statutory authority which would foster an environment of 
greater accountability. The adoption of disclosure requirements which provide 
more information about the quality of management and the structure, composi-
tion, and functions of the board and its committees would serve to encourage 
improvements i n corporate governance and would provide investors with infor-
mation vital to an assessment of management. O f particular importance, i n my 
view, is expanded information about the business and personal relationships 
between board members or nominees and the corporation; information about com-
mittees and about director resignations and the reasons therefore; and disclosure 
about directors fees, indemnification arrangements, and an indication of the 
number of meetings attended. Changes i n the listing requirements of self 
regulatory organizations also seem to warrant further attention. Additionally, 
the continued articulation of directors' responsibilities, both through reports of 
investigation and the issuance of "white papers" or guidelines could be fruitful. 
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Similarly, some expansion of the role of shareholders in the corporate electoral 
process, such as the adoption of a rule permitting shareholder nominations in 
corporate proxy materials, i n my view, would provide a safety valve for expres-
sions of deep-seated dissatisfaction with management performance. Despite the 
fact that such a procedure would not affect board composition or the outcome 
of corporate elections i n the majority of cases, it could increase the chances of 
including true shareholder representatives on boards which have not been re-
sponsive to investor concerns, particularly where institutional holders are stimu-
lated to use their voting power. 
These proposals would not cause any drastic changes nor are they meant to. 
Instead, it is to be hoped that the alternative I have described would provide a 
stimulus for evolution of better governance procedures and a heightened level 
of awareness among corporate leaders of the responsibilities which the public 
expects them to meet. 
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